Scientific discovery is the process of devising a new hypothesis that, in turn, leads to further experimental investigation and the eventual articulation of new ideas. Philosophical reflection on discovery has developed in several phases, reflecting the different ways that scholars have conceptualized knowledge generation and the patterns that might be discerned in the production of new theories.
In the first phase, the vast majority of philosophers were concerned with developing methodologies of scientific inquiry and seeking to formulate rules for generating certain propositions from observed phenomena. Scholars like Bacon, Newton and Whewell aimed to provide a logical account of the scientific method by identifying the steps in the reasoning process that brought about discoveries.
By contrast, others have tended to emphasize the eureka moment – a non-analyzable creative act of a gifted genius that results in novel ideas “spontaneously” springing into being fully formed. The pragmatist tradition, by contrast, stresses that discovery is an extended process that includes the reasoning processes through which a new insight is articulated and further developed. Proponents of this view argue that the reasoning involved does not follow the principles of demonstrative logic but is sufficiently systematic to merit a description as “logical”.
In recent decades, however, philosophical attention has turned to the problem of demystifying the cognitive process that leads to scientific discoveries. Drawing on resources from a range of empirical sciences, such as cognitive science, neuroscience and computational research, philosophers have tried to clarify the nature of the heuristics that guide discovery.
About the Author
